General Philosophy
A podcast by Oxford University

Categories:
41 Episodes
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General Philosophy Lecture 4 (Slides)
Published: 4/8/2010 -
4.4 The Mind-Body Problem
Published: 4/8/2010 -
4.3 Cartesian Dualism
Published: 4/8/2010 -
4.2 Possible Answers to External World Scepticism
Published: 4/8/2010 -
4.1 Scepticism about the External World
Published: 4/8/2010 -
3.2 Responses to Hume's Famous Argument
Published: 4/8/2010 -
General Philosophy Lecture 3 (Slides)
Published: 4/8/2010 -
3.1 Hume's Argument Concerning Induction
Published: 4/8/2010 -
General Philosophy Lecture 2 (Slides)
Published: 4/8/2010 -
2.7 Overview: Kant and Modern Science
Published: 4/8/2010 -
2.6 David Hume
Published: 3/16/2010 -
2.5 Nicolas Malebranche and George Berkeley
Published: 3/16/2010 -
2.4 John Locke
Published: 3/16/2010 -
2.3 Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton
Published: 3/16/2010 -
2.2 Thomas Hobbes: The Monster of Malmesbury
Published: 3/16/2010 -
2.1 Recap of General Philosophy Lecture 1
Published: 3/16/2010 -
1.4 From Galileo to Descartes
Published: 2/19/2010 -
General Philosophy Lecture 1 (Slides)
Published: 2/19/2010 -
1.3 Science from Aristotle to Galileo
Published: 2/19/2010 -
1.2 The Background of Early Modern Philosophy
Published: 2/19/2010
A series of lectures delivered by Peter Millican to first-year philosophy students at the University of Oxford. The lectures comprise of the 8-week General Philosophy course, delivered to first year undergraduates. These lectures aim to provide a thorough introduction to many philosophical topics and to get students and others interested in thinking about key areas of philosophy. Taking a chronological view of the history of philosophy, each lecture is split into 3 or 4 sections which outline a particular philosophical problem and how different philosophers have attempted to resolve the issue. Individuals interested in the 'big' questions about life such as how we perceive the world, who we are in the world and whether we are free to act will find this series informative, comprehensive and accessible.